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Abstract. Human-level artificial intelligence (HAI) surely is a special research
endeavor in more than one way: The very nature of intelligence is in the first
place not entirely clear, there are no criteria commonly agreed upon necessary or
sufficient for the ascription of intelligence other than similarity to human perfor-
mance, there is a lack of clarity concerning how to properly investigate artificial
intelligence and how to proceed after the very first steps of implementing an ar-
tificially intelligent system, etc. These and similar observations have led some
researchers to claim that HAI might not be a science in the normal sense and
would require a different approach. Taking a recently published paper by Cas-
simatis as starting point, I oppose this view, giving arguments why HAI should
(and even has to) conform to normal scientific standards and methods, using the
approach of psychometric artificial intelligence as one of the main foundations of
my position.
The dream of successfully (re-)creating intelligence has fascinated men for cen-
turies. For instance legendary creatures from the Middle Ages like the golem or the
homunculus, van Kempelen’s 18th century Mechanical Turk, or the robots described in
science fiction stories from the early 20th century to different degrees bear witness of
the never-ceasing attraction of this idea. In the second half of the 20th century, arguably
starting out with Turing’s well-known paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”
[1], this dream also was given its proper manifestation in science: Research in what
today has become an established field of scientific enquiry known as Artificial Intel-
ligence (AI) started. Still, from a certain perspective AI seems to stand out between
the modern sciences for more than one reason: Neither is there agreement upon what
shall be AI’s overall objective (i.e., whether the purpose of AI is the implementation of
technical systems supporting humans in their everyday tasks and facilitating human in-
tellectual activity, or if the purpose of AI is the creation of a computer system exhibiting
general intelligence — in doing so possibly outperforming humans in tasks requiring
reasoning and thought —, or something in between these two extremes), nor is there a
commonly accepted methodology for conducting research in AI, nor is there consensus
concerning the valuation of previous developments and the actual status quo in AI as a
story of success or perpetual failure.
These and related observations repeatedly caused philosophers of science and even
some researchers from within AI to wonder about AI being a special type of science or
to even question (and occasionally finally deny) the status of AI as a science. In what
follows, I want to share my view and arguments concerning these discussions specif-
ically focussing on the subbranch of AI dealing with Artificial General Intelligence
(AGI) or Human-Level AI (HAI), i.e., the endeavor to create computer systems that
exhibit intelligence at a level similar to humans.1 Recently, Cassimatis — himself a re-
searcher in AI with the set goal of creating machines with human-level intelligence —
in [2] advocated that, when dealing with HAI research, normal scientific standards and
methods are often incidental and even antithetical to achieving human-level intelligence
in an artificial system and that a different approach would thus be required. I oppose this
view, giving an account of Cassimatis’ position and criticism (as both, paradigmatic ex-
ample and synecdoche for a more general line of argumentation prevailing in quite
some academic discourse) and contrasting them with arguments showing why AI can
be, should be, and even has to be a science and adhere to scientific principles.2
Cassimatis’ argument for why HAI is not a normal science starts out with proclaim-
ing a significant qualitative difference in the specificity and the level of ambition of the
respective goals between research in HAI and other sciences. From his point of view, the
objectives of HAI are “more concrete and much more ambitious” [2] than the counter-
parts from other fields. Also, he claims that (H)AI historically had not been conducted
as a normal science, using Winograd’s SHRDLU as representative of the systems of
these days which allegedly did not witness experimental evaluation or formal proofs
that are obligatory part of science or engineering research reports. As the evaluation of
the first claim to me seems to be a question of personal judgement only — try to decide
which field has the more ambitious objectives, the one trying to (re-)create intelligence
at a human level (i.e., HAI) or the one aiming at obtaining “knowledge which relates to
the order of nature, or (...) to the regular succession of events” [3] (i.e., physics) —, the
latter claim should at least be considered debatable: Already in his original dissertation
[4], Winograd himself compared his SHRDLU system with other parsers and programs
(even offering rudimentary quantitative performance comparissons). As additional evi-
dence to the contrary e.g. consider the numerous introspection reports that Newell and
Simon collected and methodologically analyzed as basis for the development of their
General Problem Solver [5], in doing so implementing systematic observation, data
collection, analysis and subsequent model building as classical methodological pattern
from the natural sciences. Therefore, different from Cassimatis, I do not see a sign of
“science envy” in the observation that (almost) all of AI in its approach by now has
adopted the standards of science, but gleefully approve the diagnosis from [6] that “[i]n
terms of methodology, AI has finally come firmly under the scientific method”.
But the line of reasoning given in [2] does not stop with stating that HAI is not a
science in the normal sense, but continues with a from my point of view much stronger
and (if correct) even more serious claim. In Cassimatis’ eyes, the application of scien-
tific norms and methodological standards is not favorable for achieving HAI and often
even stands against swift progress towards this goal. He gives several arguments for
why he thinks that normal scientific methods fail HAI, drawing on comparisons with
1 Although I am well aware that this entails a particular interpretation of the term Artificial
General Intelligence, in this paper I will treat AGI and HAI as synonymous.
2 Cassimatis in [2] also gives a set of principles which he deems meaningful as basis for an
approach to HAI. In this note, I will only deal with his inquiry into the scientific status of AI,
for the time being leaving the second part of his considerations aside.
other scientific fields or general practices which he considers as important sources of
(potentially harmful) influence on HAI. In what follows, I sketch what I consider the
four main issues and rebut them.
Cassimatis’ first and second main quarrels lie with formal or empirical demonstra-
tions of correctness or optimality, and the connected computational requirements in
terms of processing power and speed. In his eyes, the believe that importance should
be assigned to showing the formal correctness of a theorem, or to empirically demon-
strating a method’s optimality with respect to a certain normative standard, goes against
the nature of human intelligence. By making reference to Simon’s notion of bounded
rationality [7], Cassimatis tries to demonstrate that human rationality falls far from op-
timality or formal correctness in all but a few cases, and thus also HAI should not use
normative notions of correctness or optimality in judging and evaluating results. Still, I
do think that Cassimatis here has an overly narrow view and that the problem he tries to
point at does not reside with optimality considerations or formal proofs itself, but rather
with the chosen normative standards. It goes without doubt that human rationality is
not optimal in any of the classical senses (i.e., with respect to the standard of classi-
cal logic, Bayesian probability theory, game theory, etc.). Also, it should be clear that
human cognition most likely does not solve difficulties arising from a problem’s ex-
orbitant computational complexity or intractability (i.e., to the best of my knowledge,
there is no convincing evidence suggesting that humans can be understood as super-
Turing computers). But this does not mean that no quantitative assessment is possible
per se. I am aware of two possible remedies for the diagnosed problem: There is an
ongoing interdisciplinary discourse trying to define new frameworks of rationality that
better encompass actual human performance than their predecessors did (cf., e.g., [8]).
But more importantly, going along a similar path, there are approaches within AI it-
self that successfully apply quantitative measures to problems in HAI research, namely
research going by the name of Psychometric Artificial Intelligence (PAI) [9, 10]. PAI
applies the full battery of techniques from psychometrics to an HAI context, setting its
internal standard by declaring that “some agent is intelligent if and only if it excels at all
established, validated tests of intelligence” [10]. This clearly makes PAI a very quan-
titatively focused field of research with clear normative principles, but still avoids the
pitfalls Cassimatis (who himself has close ties to PAI-style research endeavors) meant
to diagnose. The progress of an HAI system towards achieving the overall goal of (re-
)creating human intelligence is measured against actual human performance on what
commonly is agreed as standard means of assessing the relevant human mental capac-
ities. By doing so, optimality is not demanded anymore with respect to a hypothetical
idealized standard but with respect to achievable and reproducible testing scores of hu-
man subjects.
The third and the fourth main point Cassimatis raises relate to the fields of empir-
ical (cognitive) psychology and neuroscience. Both fields adhere to normal scientific
standards in their methodology, relying on experimental studies of (mostly) isolated in-
dividual capacities and functions, according to [2] by this inevitably not being aligned
with the standards needed for HAI. Firstly, the phenomena studied very often may not
be directly crucial for progress towards the goal of solving the overall intelligence puz-
zle. Secondly, the approach of averaging over (a possibly high number of) subjects in
an experimental evaluation abstracts away from the individual, thus yielding results
which provide general, decontextualized average predictions of the behavior of a cog-
nitive system instead of individual-specific, context-sensitive ones — thus seemingly
also not contributing to solving the intelligence puzzle on an individual level. Whilst
these observations by themselves seem correct to me, I do not agree on Cassimatis’
assessment and interpretation. Clearly, whilst general cognitive psychology is signifi-
cantly different from differential psychology in its methods, results and ambitions, the
insights gained in cognitive capacities on a general level are as valid to HAI as are in-
sights on an individual level. This is not only the case because each average trivially also
can be interpreted as one possible case within a population (namely the one coinciding
with the average), but also can an average prediction be bootstrapped into an individual
prediction by contextualizing it with the respective initial conditions and accompanying
factors and context. And staying under the umbrella established by scientific standards
does bring along important advantages: Quantitative and comparative methods allow
for measuring and judging progress (e.g., in the case of PAI , against human perfor-
mance, which seems to be reasonable in the case of HAI), and in doing so also enable
us to make goals and milestones specific (thus alleviating yet another problem within
the HAI context).
I strongly advocate the necessity of viewing HAI as a normal science — thus also
demanding that research in HAI has to be conducted within the framing constraints of
“normal” scientific standards —, relying on quantitative and comparative experimental
and assessment methods whenever possible, and trying to adhere to overall principles
and laws underlying cognition and intelligence that have been identified within neigh-
boring fields. The lesson is clear: Human-Level Artificial Intelligence must be a science.
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